The Income Cliff in Households: Insights from Agent-Based Computational Modelling by Grow, André & Van Bavel, Jan
1 
 
 
 
 
The Income Cliff in Households: Insights from Agent-Based Computational Modelling 
André Grow & Jan Van Bavel 
Centre for Sociological Research, University of Leuven (KU Leuven), Belgium 
 
 
 
 
 
Manuscript prepared for the 2017 conference of the European Sociological Association in 
Athens, Greece 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council 
under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007-2013)/ERC Grant 
Agreement no. 312290 for the GENDERBALL project. Eurostat, the European Commission, 
and the national statistical offices collecting the data have no responsibility for the results and 
conclusions which were drawn in this paper on the basis of the European Union Statistics on 
Income and Living Conditions data. An earlier version of this paper has been presented at the 
2017 conference of the International Network of Analytical Sociologists in Oslo, Norway.  
2 
Abstract 
In Western countries, the distribution of relative incomes within marriages tends to be skewed 
in a remarkable way. Husbands usually do not only earn more than their wives, but there is a 
striking discontinuity in their relative contributions to household income at the 50/50 
demarcation line: many wives contribute less than or almost as much as their husbands, but 
few contribute more. This ‘cliff’ has been interpreted as evidence that men and women avoid 
situations where the wife would earn more than her husband, since this would run against 
traditional gender norms. In this paper, we use agent-based computational modelling to 
demonstrate that the cliff in the relative-income distribution can also emerge without such 
avoidance. We feed our computational simulations with income data from 27 European 
countries. Results show that a cliff can emerge from differences in men’s and women’s average 
incomes, even if they do not attach special meaning to a situation in which a wife earns more 
than her husband. 
 
Keywords 
Marriage markets, income, partner preferences, households, gender inequality, agent-based 
computational modelling  
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Introduction 
Women’s labour market opportunities have improved dramatically since the mid of the 20th 
century. Starting in the 1960s, women have entered higher education in ever greater numbers 
and nowadays they often outperform men in terms of enrolment and success in tertiary 
education (Schofer and Meyer 2005). This increase in educational attainment was paralleled 
by an increase in female labour force participation and an influx of women into previously 
male dominated occupations of high status (Cha 2013). Because of these changes, some 
scholars have expected marriage to become increasingly gender egalitarian, meaning that 
spouses would become more and more similar in their labour force participation and 
contributions to the economic wellbeing of their families (e.g., Oppenheimer 1988; Torr 2011; 
Jalovaara 2012). 
There is evidence that the economic roles that men and women hold within their families 
have indeed become more similar over time (Sweeney and Cancian 2004; Torr 2011; 
Goldscheider et al. 2015). However, marked gender differences still exist in most areas of life 
(Esping-Andersen 2009; England 2010; Ridgeway 2011; Bailey and Diprete 2016), also when 
it comes to the financial contributions that men and women make to their families (Bertrand et 
al. 2015; Klesment and Van Bavel 2017). Men do not only provide a larger share of the 
household income, but there is a remarkable discontinuity at the 50/50 demarcation line. Figure 
1 illustrates this for unions (married or unmarried cohabitation) among people age 25–45 years 
in 27 European countries. It shows the distribution of couples according to the share of the 
household income that the woman provides. In most countries, the distribution steeply 
increases up to the point where the woman provides close to 50% of the household income. 
After this point, there often is a sharp drop and there are fewer unions in which the woman 
contributes more than the man.  
–Figure 1 about here– 
Bertrand et al. (2015) argued that standard economic models of partner search cannot 
account for such a ‘cliff’ in the distribution of relative incomes within households. According 
to Bertrand et al. (2015), if income is a positive criterion for partner selection, there is no reason 
to expect the distribution of relative incomes to change abruptly at the 50/50 point. In their 
words, “if matching is positive and income is the attribute of interest, a woman in the 30th 
percentile of women’s income distribution will match with the man who is in the 30th 
percentile of men’s income distribution. Whether the woman earns more or less than the man 
in absolute terms has no significance in these models” (Bertrand et al. 2015, p. 581). Thus, the 
fact that there is a discontinuity at the 50/50 point might indicate a social norm that “a man 
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should earn more than his wife” (Bertrand et al. 2015, p. 612). 
The observed discontinuity in the distribution of relative income within households at the 
50/50 point would be consistent with a norm that favours a male-breadwinner role, if such a 
norm exists. However, in this paper, we argue that such a norm is not necessary to generate the 
observed discontinuity. Instead, we suggest that the observed cliff is fully compatible with 
standard partner search models, if we consider that even in the most gender egalitarian societies 
women’s average income is lower than men’s. 
Our argument is based on the following intuition. As Bertrand et al. (2015) have pointed 
out, standard partner search models suggest that if people strive for high income partners, men 
who rank high in the male income distribution will tend to partner with women who rank high 
in the female income distribution. Some men might therefore form unions with similar-income 
partners, but because women’s average income is lower, many men will face a shortage of 
partners with similar or even higher income. Unless they are willing to remain single, these 
men will have to form unions with women who earn less than they do. Women, by contrast, 
will have to ‘settle’ less often for a lower-income partner. These differences in men’s and 
women’s marriage market opportunities are likely to not only create a right skew in the 
distribution of women’s contribution to household income, but also a discontinuity at the 50/50 
point. This occurs even if people are not more aversive of a situation in which the wife out-
earns her husband than of a situation in which he earns more. 
We demonstrate the logical consistency of our argument with a simulation study, in which 
we compare the outcomes of several marriage market models. Our models are based on earlier 
research in economics and sociology and assume that people have a positive preference for 
income in their partners that is the same for men and women. For simplicity, the models assume 
that income is the only mate selection criterion. This means that when confronted with two 
spousal alternatives who differ in their income, people prefer the one with the higher income. 
The models differ in their specific assumptions about partner search, but none of them assumes 
that there is a norm that a husband should earn more than his wife. We submit each model to 
computational simulation experiments which we initialize with empirical income data for the 
27 European countries shown in Figure 1. In our analyses of the empirical distributions of 
incomes within households, we include both marriage and unmarried cohabitation. Across 
Europe, cohabitation has been on the rise in recent years and in some countries is attaining a 
status similar to marriage (Hiekel et al. 2014); for simplicity, we use the term ‘marriage’ in the 
remainder of this paper and by that refer to both union types. 
Our results show that differences in the earnings between men and women can not only 
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lead to a right skew but also to a discontinuity in the relative income distribution. This happens 
in the absence of a male-breadwinner norm. In fact, our results show that standard marriage 
market models would imply an even stronger discontinuity than can be observed empirically. 
Our results thus support our argument and our work adds to research that cautions against 
inferring preferences and social norms from aggregate-level mating patterns (e.g., Grow et al. 
forthcoming; Kalick and Hamilton 1986; England 2004; Smaldino and Schank 2011; Grow 
and Van Bavel 2015).  
 
Modelling marriage markets 
Observed heterosexual marriage patterns are commonly assumed to derive from two-sided 
partner search on a marriage market (Willekens 2010). This notion holds that both men and 
women are searching for a spouse among the available alternatives of the opposite sex. Their 
search is guided by a set of preferences for the characteristics that their partner should have, 
but the realization of these preferences is constrained by the composition of the marriage 
market. If there is a shortage of alternatives with the desired characteristics, the opportunities 
to find the ‘ideal’ mate are limited, and people somehow need to adjust to this reality. These 
adjustments can take different forms, such as widening and prolonging search, settling for a 
partner who is less than ideal, or even foregoing marriage altogether (England and Farkas 1986; 
Oppenheimer 1988). 
Determining which social processes have generated observed marriage patterns is often 
difficult, and it can be misleading to infer people’s partner preferences from aggregate marriage 
patterns, because very different preferences can lead to very similar patterns (Smaldino and 
Schank 2011; Van Bavel and Grow 2016). For example, over the last decades, the share of 
marriages in which the husband is more educated than the wife has decreased, and the share of 
marriages in which she is more educated has increased. This might result from changing 
cultural norms, which in the past held that a man should have a higher socioeconomic status 
than his wife (cf. Esteve et al. 2012). However, the same changes in educational pairings can 
result from the fact that in the past women were on average less educated than men, but 
nowadays tend to be more educated. Today, there simply are fewer possibilities for women to 
partner with somebody who is more educated, even if they wanted to (Grow and Van Bavel 
2015). Similarly, it is well known that the high correlation of physical attractiveness ratings 
within couples which has often been observed in empirical research (e.g., Berscheid et al. 1971) 
can result from a preference for partners with similar attractiveness, but also from the 
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competitive pressures that a preference for very attractive partners creates (Kalick and 
Hamilton 1986).  
Agent-based computational modelling makes it possible to deal with some of the 
challenges that the study of two-sided partner search processes poses (Willekens 2010; Zinn 
2016). With this approach, researchers make explicit assumptions about the preferences and 
constraints that guide people’s partnering decisions. These assumptions are then implemented 
in formal models, which are submitted to computational simulations of partner search in 
potentially large and heterogeneous populations. By varying the assumptions that underlie the 
behaviour of the artificial agents at the micro level, it is possible to explore theoretically 
whether different preferences and behaviours can lead to similar–or different–marriage patterns 
at the macro level (Billari et al. 2003; Todd et al. 2013; Van Bavel and Grow 2016). Here, we 
make use of this approach to demonstrate the logical consistency of our argument. 
We consider several models that differ in their specific assumptions about partner search, 
but that all assume the same country-specific marriage market structures. In each country, there 
are 1,000 men and 1,000 women (to which we also refer as male and female ‘agents’), who are 
searching for a spouse. Each agent has a fixed annual income, y, which they are randomly 
assigned based on the country- and gender-specific income distributions among married people 
age 25–49 years, as observed in the 2007 and 2011 waves of the European Union Statistics on 
Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). Figure 2 shows these distributions for each of the 
27 national marriage markets that we consider. As can be seen from this figure, women’s 
average income is lower than men’s in all countries. There are also relatively more women than 
men with no income, but fewer women with high incomes. 
–Figure 2 about here– 
In the remainder of this this section, we present three different models which we develop 
in a step-wise fashion. We start from a classical matching model that has frequently been used 
in economic research on marriage markets. The second and the third model relax some of the 
simplifying assumptions that this model makes, based on insights from research in sociology 
and social psychology, to reflect crucial aspects of two-sided partner search processes more 
realistically. We submit each of the three models to systematic simulation experiments and 
discuss the outcomes that they generate. 
 
An economic matching model 
Economists who study marriage markets often have a particular interest in stable marriage 
matchings. A stable matching is achieved when “there is no married person who would rather 
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be single [… and] there are no two (married or unmarried) persons wo prefer to form a union 
[with each other]” (Weiss 1997, p. 100). The interest in stable matchings derives from the 
presumption that marriage assignments that do not satisfy both conditions will either not form 
or are likely to dissolve (Weiss 1997). Hence, the study of stable marriage matchings makes it 
possible to describe the marriage patterns that we might expect if the marriage market would 
be in a stable equilibrium. This provides a useful starting point for our analysis. 
Gale and Shapley (1962) pioneered research on two-sided matching by describing an 
algorithm that can generate stable matchings in any market. In developing this algorithm (from 
here on also called the GS-algorithm), the authors were agnostic as to which characteristics 
matter for partner selection. They simply assumed that both men and women can assign each 
member of the opposite sex a subjective utility that they expect to derive from marrying this 
particular person, and that people can rank all available alternatives according to this utility in 
descending order. Gale and Shapley (1962) also assumed that the utility that people expect 
from any marriage is higher than the utility from remaining single, so that they always prefer 
being married over being single. Finally, they assumed that the members of one sex (say men) 
decide to whom they want to propose marriage, whereas the members of the other sex (say 
women) decide which proposals to accept. Based on these assumptions, the following iterative 
partner selection process leads to stable matchings; the resulting pattern can differ when women 
get the opportunity to propose and use different partner selection criteria than men, but the 
result is the same when men and women positively value the same characteristics in a partner, 
no matter members of which sex gets to propose (Weiss 1997).1 We assume that both men and 
women value income positively and it therefore does not matter for our results whether men or 
women propose. Yet, for sake of simplicity, in our description of the algorithm we assume that 
it is men who propose: 
(1) Each man who is not engaged (or, in the terminology of Gale and Shapley (1962), 
‘matched’) to a woman yet proposes to the woman who ranks highest in his list of 
alternatives. Any draw in this list is resolved randomly. 
                                                 
1 In men and women value the same characteristics in partners, the highest-ranking man in terms of the valuable 
characteristics will match with the highest-ranking woman, the second-highest-ranking man will match with the 
second-highest-ranking woman, and so on. This is congruent with Bertrand et al.’s (2015) assertion that economic 
models predict that if men and women have a positive preference for income in their partners, the resulting 
marriages will be among people who are in the same percentile of the income distribution among the members of 
their own sex. 
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(2) Each woman considers the proposals that she has received and: 
(2.1) If she is not matched to a man yet, she accepts the proposal of the man she prefers 
most, so that they get matched. She rejects the proposals by all other men and is 
removed from the rejected men’s lists of alternatives.  
(2.2) If she is matched already, she keeps the proposal from the man she prefers most 
and rejects all other proposals. She then compares the utility she derives from her 
current partner with the utility she would derive from the proposing man. If the 
utility that she derives from her current partner is equal to or higher than that of 
the proposing man, she rejects the proposal. However, if the utility of the 
proposing man is higher, the woman un-matches from her current partner and 
matches with the proposing man. The woman is then removed from the rejected 
men’s lists of alternatives. 
These steps are repeated until all men are matched or have exhausted their list of alternatives.2 
We have applied the GS-algorithm to the 27 national marriage markets that we consider 
here. Given that agents are assigned their income probabilistically, and given that draws in their 
alternatives lists are resolved randomly, we have conducted 25 independent simulation runs 
per country, and averaged outcomes across runs within countries. Figure 3 shows the results of 
this simulation experiment and compares the simulated distributions of relative income with 
the empirically observed distributions. The results that the simulation model generates tend to 
trace the observed patterns closely in the left-hand part of the distributions, where women 
contribute relatively little to household incomes. However, across countries, the simulation 
model tends to create a peak close to the point where women contribute about 40% of the 
household income. After this peak, the distributions tend to drop quickly again, and in most 
countries, there are very few unions in which the wife earns more than the husband. This is 
exemplified by the results for Norway. In both the simulation outcomes and the empirically 
observed data, the share of couples increases steadily from the point where women contribute 
almost nothing to household income, up to the point where they contribute about 30%. From 
this point onwards, the couple shares that the simulation model generates rise rapidly and reach 
about 42% at the point where women contribute about 40% of the household income. After 
this, the simulated distribution drops sharply, and there are almost no couples where the wife 
contributes more than 50%. Thus, compared to the observed data, the GS-algorithm creates 
                                                 
2 Members of the proposing sex can exhaust their list of alternatives before being matched if the sex-ratio is 
imbalanced so that there is a shortage of opposite-sex members. 
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relative-income distributions that are even more skewed than observed empirically. Most 
importantly, the model generates a discontinuity but this discontinuity occurs already at the 
40/60 point, rather than at 50/50. 
–Figure 3 about here– 
 
Sequential partner search (Extension 1) 
The GS-algorithm assumes that partner search takes place on a perfect market. There are no 
search frictions, no search costs, and everybody has full information about all the available 
alternatives. In reality, the search for a spouse is a sequential and costly process and is subject 
to incomplete information and uncertainty (Weiss 1997). That is, instead of having knowledge 
about the characteristics of all members of the marriage market, people often need to invest 
effort to meet opposite-sex members and to learn about their characteristics. Research in the 
wake of Gale and Shapley (1962) has incorporated these features of real marriage markets in 
more complex partner search models (e.g., Adachi 2003; Lee 2009). 
In these more complex models, the central question is ‘how should people decide when to 
stop their search?’. If men and women cannot be sure who they will meet in the future, they 
need to somehow trade off the utility from marrying one of the currently available alternatives 
vs. the utility they may derive from finding somebody even more attractive in the future, net 
of the costs that prolonged search creates. This problem can be solved by determining people’s 
reservation quality, which is the minimal quality that a given man or women should aspire for 
in a partner; they should stop their search when they find a partner whose quality is equal to or 
higher than this value. The reservation quality can be calculated based on information about 
the composition of the marriage market (i.e., how likely is it that people will meet very 
attractive alternatives?), about the characteristics of the focal individual (i.e., how attractive is 
the person for opposite-sex members?), and the distribution of characteristics among the 
members of the own sex (i.e., how fierce is the competition?). In this way, even if not 
everybody will always find the best possible partner, people can expect that the utility of the 
partner that they select is likely to balance their search costs. 
As several scholars have pointed out, the reservation quality is useful to determine how 
people should behave if they would conduct their partner search in a perfectly rational manner, 
but the calculations that are necessary for this are often too complex to be applied by the 
average person in real life (e.g., Todd et al. 2005, 2013). Instead, people tend to apply decision 
rules and heuristics that are much simpler, but that still tend to yield satisfactory outcomes. In 
particular, research in sociology and social psychology suggests that people tend to use their 
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own quality as a point of reference, without engaging in explicit calculations to determine their 
optimal reservation quality (e.g., Townsend 1989; Sloman and Sloman 1988; Kenrick et al. 
1993; Penke et al. 2007; Todd et al. 2013). This approach tends to be efficient because of the 
two-sided nature of partner search. People who have high quality characteristics are in high 
demand and therefore have good chances of attracting partners who also are of high quality. 
They can therefore afford to set their aspirations high and still find a partner with reasonable 
search effort. People with characteristics that are in lower demand, by contrast, are likely to 
experience more difficulties in attracting high quality partners. They therefore often need to set 
their aspirations lower, to avoid engaging in excessive search efforts that, in the worst case, 
might not lead to marriage (Penke et al. 2007). 
To reflect the notions that (1) partner search is a sequential process and that (2) people 
tend to use their own qualities as a point of reference for partner selection, we have adjusted 
the original GS-algorithm in the following way. In line with Gale and Shapley (1962), we 
assume that men and women prefer marriage over being single, but we also assume that they 
aspire to partners whose income is at least as high as their own. Hence, as long as a given male 
or female agent is single, or is matched to somebody whose income is lower than their own, 
they actively search for a (better) partner. By contrast, agents who are matched to somebody 
who earns at least as much as they do cease their search. It is important to note that these 
preferences are gender-symmetrical in the model. That is, both men and women are content 
with a situation in which their partner earns as much as or more than they do. They are not 
more aversive of a situation in which the wife earns more than the husband than they are of a 
situation in which he out-earns her (as would be implied by a male-breadwinner norm). The 
actual search process consists of the following sequence of steps:  
(1) Determine for each man and woman whether they are actively looking for a partner. 
This is the case when they are single, or when they are matched to somebody who earns 
less than they do. 
(2) Randomly pair all men who are looking for a partner with exactly one woman who is 
also looking for a partner (some men or women might not be paired if their numbers 
are imbalanced). Within each pair, both agents determine whether they want to signal 
to the other agent that they want to start a relation with them. These decisions are based 
on the following rules: 
(2.1) If a given agent is single, they always indicate that they are willing to start a 
relation with the agent they have been paired with. 
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(2.2) If a given agent is already in a relation, they signal that they are willing to start a 
relation with the agent they have been paired with if the income of the alternative 
is higher than that of their current partner. 
(3) For all pairs in which both agents have indicated that they are willing to form a relation, 
break relations with possible current partners and let them start a relation with each 
other; dissolve all other pairings. 
These steps are repeated for up to a number of I iterations. 
As for the GS-algorithm, we have applied the sequential search model to conduct 25 
separate simulation runs in each of the 27 countries and averaged results across runs. In this 
experiment, we set I to 20. Figure 4 shows the outcomes of this simulation experiment. As the 
figure illustrates, the distributions of relative income that this model generates resemble those 
that we have obtained from the GS-algorithm, but they are closer to the empirically observed 
distributions. In particular, the peaks in the relative-income distributions are close to the 50/50 
demarcation line. After this point, there usually is a sharp drop and there are very few marriages 
where the wife earns more than the husband. Also, compared to the GS-algorithm, the shares 
of marriages where the wife earns more than her husband are higher and they are closer to the 
empirically observed values. 
Why does the sequential search model generate this sharp drop at the 50/50 point? Earlier 
simulation research has shown that the competitive pressures that a universal preference for 
high quality partners creates leads to matchings that show a high correlation in partner quality 
(e.g., Kalick and Hamilton 1986). In our model, this fact tends to create a heaping of unions 
close to the 50/50 point in terms of relative income. Yet, given that women tend to earn less 
than men, men are more likely to encounter women who earn less than they do, rather than 
women who earn more. This increases the likelihood that those unions in which partners differ 
in their incomes will be on the left-hand side of the 50/50 point, thereby creating a ‘cliff’ in the 
distribution. 
Taken together, our results suggest that the income cliff can emerge even if both women 
and men desire partners who earn as much as or even more than they do. This preference 
structure is in stark contrast with the structure that a male-breadwinner norm would imply, 
namely that only women would prefer partners with equal or higher income, whereas men 
would prefer partners with equal or lower income. 
–Figure 4 about here– 
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Sequential search when a partner is present (Extension 2) 
In the model that considers sequential search, agents who have found a partner that meets their 
aspirations cease their search completely, whereas agents who do not have found such a partner 
yet continue their search with full effort. In reality, for most people it will not be possible to 
continue their search for a partner with full effort when they already are in a relation. This is 
partly because spending time with their partner reduces the time that is available for searching 
for an alternative, but also because active search puts the current relation at risk even is no 
alternative is available yet (Simão and Todd 2003; Stauder 2006). Conversely, even people 
who are very satisfied with their current partner might sometimes encounter more attractive 
alternatives accidentally during their daily activities (e.g., at work) (Grow et al. forthcoming; 
South et al. 2001; McKinnish 2004). To incorporate these aspects of partner search into the 
sequential search model, we have introduced the parameters 𝛼 (0 < 𝛼 < 1) and β (0 < β < 1). 
These parameters govern the probability that agents who already are in a relation encounter 
possible alternatives in a given iteration. More specifically, 𝛼 governs the probability that 
agents whose partner’s income is lower than their own encounter a possible alternative (i.e., 
are available for being paired with an opposite-sex member in step (2) of the sequential search 
model described above), whereas β governs the probability that agents whose partner’s income 
is equal to or higher than their own encounter a possible alternative. 
Generally, we assume that β < 𝛼 is plausible in most empirical situations. The reason is 
that even though both members of a union might have their time equally ‘bound up’ in their 
relation, their motivations for actively searching for a better alternative are likely to differ. In 
relations in which one member of the couple contributes more to the relation than the other 
(e.g., in terms of income) the partners are likely to notice this inequity and this can lead them 
to experience strains that reduce their satisfaction with their relation (Sprecher 1986, 1998). 
While both partners might experience such strain, the partner who is under-benefiting (i.e., who 
contributes relatively more) is likely to experience more strain than the partner who is over-
benefiting (i.e., who contributes relatively less). The under-benefitting partner is therefore 
likely to be less satisfied with the relation and has a larger incentive to look for outside options 
(Sprecher 1986, 1992, 2001). It is important to note that also here we assume that these 
processes are gender-symmetrical. That is, we assume that both men and women who are in a 
relation with a partner who earns less than they do are more likely to search for a higher-income 
alternative than people who have a partner who earns as much as or more than they do. 
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Figure 5 shows the results of a simulation experiment in which the number of iterations (I) 
was set to 20, whereas 𝛼 was set to .4, and β was set to .2. Across countries, the outcomes that 
the extended sequential search model generates come even closer to the empirically observed 
distributions than that of the simple sequential search model. For example, in Romania, the 
outcomes that the model generates closely trace the observed distribution of relative income. 
In some countries, the cliff in the relative-income distributions that the simulation model 
generates is still somewhat larger than observed empirically (e.g., in Greece). However, the 
distributions that the simulation model generates are qualitatively similar to those observed 
empirically and this is the case even if we do not assume that people evaluate a situation in 
which the wife earns more than the husband any differently than a situation in which the 
husband earns more. 
–Figure 5 about here– 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
In this paper, we have explored whether it is necessary to assume a male-breadwinner norm to 
explain why there is a discontinuity in the distributions of the relative income that men and 
women contribute to their households. Earlier research has suggested that the observed 
discontinuity at the 50/50 point might indicate such a norm, meaning that both men and women 
would be aversive of a situation in which a wife would out-earn her husband. We have 
suggested that a discontinuity at the 50/50 point might emerge even if people would not attach 
special meaning to a situation in which a wife out-earns her husband and simply value high 
income in their partners. The reason for this is that there are differences in the average incomes 
of men and women. These differences limit men’s opportunities to find partners who earn as 
much as or more than they do, whereas this is easier for women. We have explored the logical 
consistency of our argument with three different simulation models that differ in their 
assumptions about partner search. We found that each of these models can generate a 
discontinuity in the relative-income distribution to the advantage of men, without the need to 
assume that there is a male-breadwinner norm. Our results thus highlight the risks of inferring 
preferences and norms from observed marriage patterns. As Smaldino and Shank (2011) have 
pointed out, marriage markets are complex systems and different preference structures and 
behaviours at the individual level can lead to similar outcomes at the population level. 
It is important to highlight that we do not claim that a male-breadwinner norm does not 
exist in at least some countries or in some parts of the population of a given country. Rather, 
our results suggest that such a norm might be just one of several pieces in the puzzle of income 
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differences within heterosexual households. It is also important to highlight that our models 
are ‘minimal’ models, which describe a set of conditions that are sufficient to generate a 
discontinuity in the distributions of relative income across households. As such, the models 
abstract from some processes that might affect marriage patterns in real life. One crucial aspect 
that we have neglected here is that peoples’ incomes might be endogenous to the marriage 
process itself. In particular, both men and women tend to adjust their labour market behaviour 
as a result of marriage and the anticipation of children within their newly formed families. This 
is especially the case for women, who often reduce their working hours once children are 
anticipated, and who sometimes do not fully return to the labour force even after their offspring 
has left the parental home. If this is the case, the income data that underlies our simulations 
might be partly affected by the process of marriage itself, whereas we have treated income as 
exogenously given. As a consequence, our modelling approach is rather conservative: we find 
that differences in the incomes of men and women can lead to a discontinuity in the relative 
income distribution, even if we neglect potential intra-couple processes that might affect 
people’s incomes once a family has formed and thereby contribute to the empirically observed 
discontinuity. 
Furthermore, we have neglected mechanisms that might contribute to similarity in 
partners’ incomes, net of any partner preferences and norms. In our simulations, we have 
focused on national marriage markets, but in reality people tend to select their partners from 
more local contexts. That is, people spend much of their time in their neighbourhoods, schools, 
and work places, and this increases the chance that they will meet prospective partners in these 
contexts. To the extent that people in these contexts resemble each other more in their 
socioeconomic backgrounds than any randomly selected members of the population this is 
likely to increase the similarity in income than can be observed within couples. Future research 
might extend our work to incorporate such more ‘local’ marriage markets in the simulation 
process and explore how this affects results. 
Despite this need for future research, our results have important implications for theorizing 
about households in the light of changing gender norms. Over the last decades, many Western 
societies have moved towards more gender egalitarian attitudes (e.g., Zentner and Eagly 2015). 
Our results suggest that such attitudes might not translate into more egalitarian family 
structures, in particular when it comes to men’s and women’ contributions to the financial 
resources of their households, as long as there are systematic differences in the incomes of men 
and women. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1 Shares that women contribute to household income in 27 countries 
Note: The share that the woman provides to household income is calculated as yw/(yw+ym), 
where yw and ym refer to the income of the woman and the man, respectively. The grey vertical 
line indicates the point where the share of the household income that the woman provides is .5. 
The number in the upper left corner of each panel shows the share of couples in which the 
20 
woman contributes nothing to household income.  
Source: Pooled data from the 2007 and 2011 waves of the cross-sectional versions of the 
European Union Statistics on Income and Labour Conditions (EU-SILC). We have selected 
women who were married or living in unmarried cohabitation with a male partner at the time 
of the survey, and who were 25–45 years old and had a partner in the same age range. We only 
selected unions in which at least one partner had positive, non-zero income. The income 
reference year is the year prior to the survey, so that the income data pertain to the years 2006 
and 2010. Sampling weights have been applied.  
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Figure 2 Comparison of women’s and men’s incomes across 27 countries 
Note: Income was measured in national currencies. The vertical lines show the average 
incomes of men and women.  
Source: Pooled data from the 2007 and 2011 waves of the cross-sectional versions of the 
European Union Statistics on Income and Labour Conditions (EU-SILC). We have selected all 
men and women who were 25–45 years old and who had zero or non-negative income. The 
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income reference year is the year prior to the survey, so that the income data pertain to the 
years 2006 and 2010. Sampling weights have been applied.  
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Figure 3 Comparison of the relative-income distributions observed in the EU-SILC data with 
those generated by the GS-algorithm 
Note: The share that the woman provides to household income is calculated as yw/(yw+ym), 
where yw and ym refer to the income of the woman and the man, respectively. The grey vertical 
line indicates the point where the share of the household income that the woman provides is .5. 
The numbers in the upper left corner of each panel show the shares of couples in which the 
24 
woman contributes nothing to the household income, as obtained from the simulations (‘s’) 
and observed (‘o’) in the empirical data. 
Source: The simulation results are based on our simulation experiments with the GS-algorithm. 
The empirical data are the same as for Figure 1.  
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Figure 4 Comparison of the relative-income distributions observed in the EU-SILC data with 
those generated by the sequential search model (Extension 1) 
Note: The share that the woman provides to household income is calculated as yw/(yw+ym), 
where yw and ym refer to the income of the woman and the man, respectively. The grey vertical 
line indicates the point where the share of the household income that the woman provides is .5. 
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The numbers in the upper left corner of each panel show the shares of couples in which the 
woman contributes nothing to the household income, as obtained from the simulations (‘s’) 
and observed (‘o’) in the empirical data. 
Source: The simulation results are based on our simulation experiments with the sequential 
search model (Extension 1). The empirical data are the same as for Figure 1.
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Figure 5 Comparison of the relative-income distributions observed in the EU-SILC data with 
those generated by the sequential search model that considers changes in partner search 
behaviour when a partner is present (Extension 2) 
Note: The share that the woman provides to household income is calculated as yw/(yw+ym), 
where yw and ym refer to the income of the woman and the man, respectively. The grey vertical 
line indicates the point where the share of the household income that the woman provides is .5. 
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The numbers in the upper left corner of each panel show the shares of couples in which the 
woman contributes nothing to the household income, as obtained from the simulations (‘s’) 
and observed (‘o’) in the empirical data. 
Source: The simulation results are based on our simulation experiments with the sequential 
search model, considering that people’s search behavior changes when they are already in a 
relation (Extension 2). The empirical data are the same as for Figure 1. 
